The basis of this conflict is described by Turner (1960) in a classic paper. Turner describes two normative systems which stand as ideal types in our society: the contest and sponsored mobility norms.
Individuals in the United States grow up believing that everyone has the opportunity to advance and that, as "the land of opportunity," the United States has no policies or practices which cut off anyone's possibility for advancement or which protect any elite from downward mobility. Turner calls this the contest mobility norm. In a selection system which follows the contest mobility norm, selections are delayed and individuals are allowed complete freedom for mobility through most of their careers. Of course, even in a contest system, selections must sometimes occur; but the contest system delays selections and minimizes their consequences. It instills an "insecurity of elite position. In a sense, there is no final arrival under contest mobility, since each person may be displaced by newcomers throughout his life" (Turner I960,-p. 860). Nor are there any final losses, since everyone is kept in the running and offered another chance to qualify for advancement (p. 861).
A selection system following the contest mobility norm embodies several desirable features for an organization. In permitting late mobility, such a system helps to maintain motivation and morale by continually holding out the possibility that one's efforts may have a payoff. Moreover, such a system is quite consistent with Americans' longstanding mistrust of selection criteria. If selection criteria are mistrusted, then a selection system which makes few selections and delays them as late as possible will be relatively less objectionable. Moreover, it would leave maximum opportunity for "late blooming" or late failing to alter individuals' destinies. Such a system also minimizes the chances of errors.
Of course, this minimizing of errors also has its costs; for the later that selection occurs, the less time individuals have to acquire specialized training. Normative ambivalence emerges here because the loss of adequate specialized training is seen as inefficient and, consequently, as undesirable.
In contrast, the sponsored mobility norm stresses efficiency. It pre-scribes that selections occur as early as possible so that the system can maximally benefit from the efficiencies of specialized training and socialization. In a selection system which follows the sponsored norm, individuals are selected for their ultimate careers very early and departures from these early assigned careers are not permitted. Those who are selected for elite status are maximally separated from others, are given specialized training and socialization, and are guaranteed that they-and only they-will attain elite status.
Although Turner attributed this norm predominantly to Britain, it is clear that there are elements of this norm in the United States as well. Surely the United States is a country that values efficiency. The wide-spread existence of ability grouping and curriculum grouping in public schools (Findlay and Bryan 1971; Rosenbaum, 1976) and of manpower planning in industry suggest the importance this nation attributes to efficiency in the selection of individuals for specialized training. The early selection systems of Plato's Republic and Young's (1908) "meritocracy" have a great deal of Utopian appeal to Americans.
Which of these normative models is the best description of the opportunity structure in organizations? In many organizations, strong beliefs in opportunity and in efficiency coexist; yet the two often conflict. Rarely is explicit attention given to this conflict, how it might be resolved or, indeed, how contemporary policies and practices deal with it.
This conflict is clearly manifest in the previously reported descriptions of personnel policies in some leading corporations. These policies ostensibly seek to create a sponsored system in which the organization would capitalize on the efficiencies of early selection and specialized training. Yet these organizations could not let their commitment to the contest norm be questioned, so the program descriptions are qualified by contest mobility protections: There are no guarantees for those who are selected for these programs, and there are no barriers for those who are not selected.
This ambiguity and ambivalence in policy statements may seem strange, but it is not unusual. These policy descriptions are very similar to the way high school administrators describe selection procedures for ability and curriculum grouping. In a previous study, I found that high school administrators were very reluctant to admit that their system of grouping students by ability and curriculum might affect students' opportunities to move up to a higher track, and they spoke at great length about individual students who had moved into higher tracks (Rosenbaum 1976). Yet systematic analysis of the school's records showed that only a negligible portion of the students showed upward track mobility. Administrators' evasiveness about this is apparently widespread, for the Coleman Report study of a national sample of schools found those school administrators' responses often directly contradicted the responses of a majority of the teachers and students in the same schools (Coleman et al. 1966, p. 569; Jencks et al. 1972, p. 97).
Of course, corporations can be much more open about their career practices because they are private institutions and are not as responsible to society's norms. Their primary aim is profit maximization, and career practices which presume to promote efficiency contribute to this aim. However, as the movement for "corporate responsibility" suggests, corporations are not totally exempt from society's norms, and this is all the more true for norms which affect the morale of their employees.
Corporations, like schools, are caught in the conflict between efficiency and opportunity. Although corporations are freer to admit their pursuit of efficiency, they are not exempt from opportunity norms. Corporations, like other U.S. institutions, make use of opportunity norms to stimulate employees' motivation to perform well for the company. They do not wish to admit that their career practices foreclose opportunity for employees.
As a result, it is extremely difficult to get a clear picture of the opportunity structure of most organizations.
Public reports such as those to the Conference Board are vague and sometimes evasive, company statements to employees are little better and may be worse, and employees' perceptions are ill-informed and often mistaken. Moreover, judging from Vroom's observations, even higher-level managers may not know the actual situation.
