After describing a case where a firm's young star drifted toward failure because of unwillingness to confront her boss for clarification of her authority, we examine delegation theory and the questions you might pose to define your responsibility more precisely.
Jane Wilson at Cutting Edge
Cutting Edge Associates, Inc. is an aggressive engineering design and consulting firm. Geographically dispersed, it contains five divisional branches that operate quite autonomously in bidding for and conducting projects. Business has expanded tenfold in the past few decades.
At a meeting of the board of directors, attention was directed to the noticeable rate of increase in divisional operating and overhead costs. E. P. Jefferson, the president, indicated that a study would be initiated to investigate these costs.
The Systems Committee: Shortly thereafter, Jefferson called in Jane Wilson, one of his two assistants, described the general problem of reducing costs and told her that the firm had reached the size where it needed a person to devote full time to operating methods and facilities. He said that he had talked this matter over with Frank Surface, the vice president of personnel, and that both of them had agreed "that you would be a fine person for this position. Surface and I feel that you might have an advisory committee made up of one representative from each branch, and that such a group could decide on ways to utilize our buildings, equipment, and people more effectively. Each of the division managers will appoint a person to meet with you regularly."
Within three months of the original reference to the subject at the directors' meeting, Wilson received the title of manager of personnel and equipment planning. All division managers had appointed, at Jefferson's request, a person to what became known as the "systems committee." Later, the committee appears to have taken its work seriously, as evidenced by: (1) a record of regular meetings held over an eighteen-month period, (2) transcripts of those meetings and exhibits which show that all six members entered the discussions, (3) seventeen recommendations in writing, supported by a total of 1,800 pages of research data and reasoning, (4) the fact that meetings often lasted four to five hours extending after working hours, and (5) the statements of all committee members that they enjoyed the project, felt that they were accomplishing something for the firm and had personally enjoyed being on the committee. All members also expressed their high regard for Jane Wilson and felt that she has done a good job.
The seventeen recommendations cover such matters as salary scales, a policy on days off for personal business, a policy on central purchasing of janitorial supplies, and a recommendation that certain models of personal computers, dictating machines, and copy machines be adopted uniformly in all branches.
After an year or so, Wilson had made an inspection trip to the branches and had come to the conclusion that there was much wasted space in the offices because administrative, professional, and clerical personnel had purchased equipment such as desks, computer stands, and tables that pleased them personally but that were too large and expensive for what the firm needed to keep up its public appearance. In addition, group leaders in some branches had succeeded in having the manager approve walls for private offices. A consultant had advised Wilson that the firm might save $40,000 a year if only division managers were to have private offices and if furniture were more modest and standardized. The committee, however, has not yet formulated recommendations on this matter.
Relations with Division Managers: Managers have been kept informed of the committee's general work over the eighteen-month period. Most managers selected a section head or group leader to represent them. It appears that these members made a real effort to keep their managers informed. Sid August from the mid-western branch reports that he has spent at least an hour a month with his boss telling him what the committee is doing and asking for his ideas. Audrey Gambrino of the southeastern branch says that she has been able to confer briefly with her boss about once a month on the subjects the committee is working on. Other members report that they too have been able to see their superiors. Nonetheless, in all cases except for the mid-west, they say that their managers quite naturally do not have the time to go into the details of committee recommendations and that the managers have not been enthusiastic about implementing any of the proposals.
The committee has talked about the best way to get its recommendations adopted. Sid August claims that his manager is ready to implement many of them and that it is up to each member to convince his or her own manager. All others argue that the president should issue the recommendations as directives over his signature. The reason given by Gambrino is typical: "We're convinced that the recommendations are best for the firm but the managers just won't buy them. The only way to get the managers to carry them out is to have Mr. Jefferson lay them out as official, and let it be known that they are going to be put into effect. Of course, they should be acknowledged as being drawn up by the department of personnel and equipment with some advice from our committee."
Jine Wilson reported in her meeting with the president that it looked as if it is going to be "rather touchy" to get the division managers to accept the recommendations. Jefferson thereupon stated that his own knowledge of the committee proposals was rather sketchy (even though he had discussed them in part with Wilson periodically over the past year). Jefferson therefore decided to call a meeting of all division managers and committee members so that he and everyone concerned could be acquainted in detail with them.
The Meeting of the Committee and Division Managers: The meeting started at 2:00 PM and was scheduled to last until 5:00, but actually ran over until 6:00. The committee, division managers, Jefferson, and Wilson were present. Jefferson opened the meeting by stating that its purpose was to study the committee recommendations and, it was hoped, to arrive at a decision on whether they should be implemented.
The committee members had talked confidentially among themselves before the meeting and agreed that Jane Wilson must be the one to present the findings and, by and large, the one to defend them. This plan was carried out. After a reading of the seventeen recommendations, the entire meeting was taken up by a discussion of the first two which covered a standard salary scale for clerical and nonprofessional staff and a specification of the rules on employee personal days off (anything in excess of two days must be taken on vacation or without pay).
In the discussion, the division managers found some points on which they disagreed among themselves, and some on which they all agreed but disagreed with the committee--especially on how certain individual employees might be hurt by standard policies. After the meeting, the president remarked to Jane that "the combined thinking of the managers, with all their experience, made quite an impression on me. I have confidence in you, but I can't help but wonder if your committee really worked out the best recommendations for all on these issues. If you had, why couldn't you convince the managers instead of raising all this criticism?"
What went wrong?
At Cutting Edge, Jefferson (and Wilson) seemed to assume that if the committee came up with "the best" recommendations that somehow they would be automatically implemented by division managers because of their brilliance or because the managers would have bought into the recommendations since they supposedly came from their "representatives" on the committee. But these were naive assumptions.
The so-called representatives on the committee were cast in a very difficult role--that of initiating changes that would reduce the autonomy of their direct superiors! Since the firm had a history of encouraging entrepreneurial independence in the field, strengthening central rules and standardization flew in the face of a decentralized tradition that the division managers felt was still working fine. Given the awkwardness of their position, it is not surprising that the committee members quickly decided not to be "representatives" but simply a task force concerned with overall problems. Thus, most of them avoided communicating anything too threatening to their branch managers while warning Wilson that few proposals would be implemented unless Jefferson issued directives.
Wilson never pressed this warning with Jefferson. Although Jane did see the president fairly frequently, Jefferson never really seemed to listen. Even after eighteen months, he was not familiar with the recommendations, probably because he didn't deem them pertinent to his own behavior. Given that Jefferson expected the changes to be made automatically without his involvement, he didn't connect Wilson's words with any action that he personally as president would have to initiate.
And Wilson, in her inexperience, let the president get away with his noninvolvement. Jane let the months drag by and the analysis pile up while she drifted like some classic Greek tragedy toward the disaster that is the situation at the end of the case.
To consider what Wilson might have done, let's first look at theory about delegation.
Delegation Clarity
The purpose of delegation is to transfer legitimate power from a superior to a subordinate so the latter can accomplish a necessary task.
Unfortunately so much delegation shares a general theme: be grudging assignment of tasks that managers would prefer to do themselves if only they had the time. And all time is not saved when a task is delegated. The superior must still supervise, monitor, and correct especially those inexperienced subordinates still learning their newly assigned tasks.
Some managers think they can do the job faster themselves. In the short run, they are probably correct. In the long run, however, delegation will enable the subordinates to develop competence and free superiors to devote time to other perhaps more important and challenging matters. That is, they will be freer if they have delegated clearly enough so that subordinates know what to do and what is expected. Unfortunately, a too frequently recurring problem is that harried superiors do not take the time to define what they expect, and inexperienced or fearful subordinates do not ask the tough questions to clarify what is expected.
Delegation Forms: Delegation is not an either/or matter; it is not either I do it, or you do it. Delegation lies on a continuum. Both managers and subordinates should realize that multiple forms of delegation exist. And each group should know what form is intended between them, particularly what degree of initiative is expected of the subordinate.
When delegating, a manager should be clear about his expectations. Clarity of initial instruction will save both time and embarrassment. After the pattern is defined, the superior should adhere to it consistently to the completion of the delegated task. Without such clarification and consistency, many subordinates will tend to fear taking actions for which they will be criticized.
Superior's Instructions
- Look into this problem. Give me all the facts. I will decide what to do.
- Let me know the alternatives available with the advantages and disadvantages of each. 1 will decide which to select.
- Recommend a course of action for my approval and signature.
- Let me know what you intend to do. Delay action until I approve it orally or with my initials.
- Let me know what you intend to do. Do it unless I say no.
- Take action. Let me know what you did and how it turns out.
- Take action. Communicate with me only if you are unsuccessful.
- Take action. No further communication with me on this matter is required.
Alternative generation: But it was precisely this aloofness that the incoming Kennedy administration in 1961 sharply criticized. John Kennedy wanted to be involved in early discussion where his own intelligence and creativity could be applied (particularly after the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco where he felt he delegated excessive power to his military advisers). This may have worked for Kennedy (who was a speed reader) but it certainly consumes time and attention, which became especially evident in the stress that fell on President Jimmy Carter because of his apparent submergence in excessive detail.
Presidents Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan seemed to lean towards granting the greatest autonomy to subordinates and require minimal time demands on the delegator. Indeed, Harry Truman was widely beloved by his subordinates for the enormous faith he expressed in them. One cabinet member reported that he once tried to report to Truman on his activities, but the president cut him short, "John, you're doing a good job. You'll hear from me when you're not. Now, let's talk about the Civil War." In similar fashion, President Reagan was praised by subordinates and others for his broad delegation. Giving autonomy and expressing faith in subordinates can be a powerful motivator.
The problem with delegating powers as mentioned above is that the superior runs the risk of being out of touch with what is going on. Fortune magazine did a cover article praising President Reagan's ability to find good people, then to delegate tasks and leave them alone- just months before the Iran-Contra affair began to come to light. And more profoundly, the organization's interest can be severely endangered by a subordinate out of control. Truman experienced this with the revered General Douglas MacArthur who, as supreme Allied commander in the Far East during the Korean War, threatened to invade China (and perhaps use nuclear tactical weapons) all without the authority of the president. Because he had such weak in-process control, Truman's options were reduced to only the exercise of his ultimate power to fire MacArthur from his job at immense political cost to the president. Some would argue that Reagan confronted the same problem with his national security adviser John Poindexter and his assistant Oliver North.
The perception is that George Bush was a much more involved executive than Reagan was, frequently asking questions and wanting clarification of details (at the risk, so his critics say, of not devoting sufficient attention to defining an overall vision).
Where would President Richard Nixon fit in this analysis of delegation styles? Perhaps an additional form 9: "Do it, but under no circumstances should you tell me how you did it!"
Delegation Sufficiency: One of the most hallowed of traditional organization principles is that authority should equal responsibility. Perhaps no other principle makes as much intuitive sense to the typical subordinate who feels that one should have authority sufficient to perform the task for which he or she is held accountable. If the boss has assigned responsibility for keeping the office clean, the worker must have authority to enter and to obtain the necessary supplies. Meeting this responsibility is impossible with insufficient authority. Likewise, a manager charged with increasing widget sales in Texas will be frustrated if not given authority to set competitive prices, to hire and discipline salespeople, pay market wages and bonuses, and perhaps modify the product to local customer demands.
Managers could find themselves without sufficient authority because it was never delegated to them or if offered, they failed to accept it.
Lack of Delegation: Many owners, executives, and managers complain of how overworked they are but will not delegate enough to lighten their burdens. Fear deters them. The superior may be afraid that a subordinate will not be able to perform the activity as well as he or she can and there-fore fears that his or her boss will be displeased with the results. Worse, an insecure manager may be afraid that his or her subordinates will do a better job, thus threatening the manager's future. More subtly, a manager may be anxious about not being continually on top of everything. Dependency downward on subordinates can be stressful for those adverse to risk. This anxiety can be especially great when the superior can't define precisely what is to be done and how results are to be measured.
One can sympathize with such concern, but a manager who cannot stand the anxiety of delegation is fleeing from the managerial role and ought to look for other work.
Failure to Accept Delegation: Inadequate delegation is not always the superior's fault. Some subordinates resist delegation because they want to avoid anxiety, dislike their superiors, or simply do not want to be bothered. Others may resist because they lack the self-confidence to stand criticism. Finally, subordinates may not be offered sufficient incentive to accept more than the most narrow job task. ("It's not my job.") If forced to do more, they find it easier to ask the boss repeatedly for detailed instructions. The superior may well conclude that delegating the task is not worth the effort.
Pseudo Delegation: Sometimes superiors intend to delegate and even think that they have done so, but the monkey of responsibility keeps jumping off their subordinate's shoulders and back onto their own.1
Pseudo delegation occurs when a subordinate manipulates a superior into relieving him or her of responsibility for taking the next step in a delegated task. In a kind of rubber-band effect, the intended delegation snaps back to the superior.
1. "We've got a problem: " Manager A greets one of his subordinates, B, while late for a meeting. B says "Good morning. By the way, we've got a problem. The . .." As B talks, superior A recognizes that he is not knowledgeable enough to make an immediate decision. To save time at that moment so he can get on to his meeting, A responds, "Glad you brought this up. I'm in a rush right now. Let me think about it and I'll let you know."
In such an exchange, the subordinate has cleverly relieved herself of responsibility for the next step. She only has to wait until her superior gets back to her. Miraculously, the subordinate has transformed herself into the superior because manager a now has an obligation to do something and to report back to B. Subordinate B may even "supervise" her superior by later asking how things are coming along on the problem.
2. "Send me a memo." Suppose that, at the end of a conference with subordinate C, manager A concludes, "Fine, send me a memo on that." The responsibility temporarily remains with the subordinate, but only until he sends the requested note. Once the memo leaves C's desk, the action obligation jumps to manager A. Subordinate C will do nothing until he receives A's response to the memo (and may well grumble at A's slowness).
To push the boss along, subordinate C may well write another memo to A indicating that he needs a response soon. Once again, manager A is time pressured and "supervised" by his own subordinate.
3. "I've drawn up a discussion draft." Consider the situation in which a new position has been created and subordinate D is appointed. Manager A has told her that they should get together soon to define the new job and that "I'll draw up an initial draft for our consideration." Once again, manager A has put himself into the position of making the next move. Subordinate D may spin her wheels until A produces the draft and calls for a meeting.
In each of these three incidents, the superior mistakenly assumes that the problems are "joint" when in fact they are primarily the subordinate's. Pretty soon he will be working on Saturdays while his subordinates are playing golf.
Keeping Delegated Jobs Delegated: Managers should not allow themselves to be manipulated into relieving their subordinates of responsibility for the next step. The initiative should remain with the subordinate who should then report to the superior. When talking to a subordinate about a problem, the manager's self-reminder should be, "At no time while 1 am helping you with this will your problem become my problem. When this meeting is over, the problem will leave this office exactly the way it came in-on your back."
With regard to the three incidents described previously where responsibility snapped back to the superior, perhaps manager A could have clearly directed the subordinates to take the next step.
- When told by subordinate B, "We've got a problem," A could tell B to come to his office later with the possible alternatives and her recommendation. Thus, B must work until the decision is made, not A.
- On "Send me a memo," if A understood C's problem, he might have made a decision right away. If not, he should have told C to proceed but to keep A informed.
- On "I'll draw up a discussion draft," he shouldn't. The superior should have the subordinate draw up a proposal for consideration at a time set by the superior.
Nondelegatable Responsibility
The principle that a manager can delegate authority but not responsibility has taken on the mantle of moral truth, but it is extremely difficult to follow rigorously. If A assigns certain activities and necessary authority to B, B may in turn delegate the duties and authority to C (assuming he controls sufficient resources). However, if C fails to perform the activities satisfactorily, A still holds B accountable. A would hang B, not C. In short, B can delegate some authority and create responsibility for C, but B cannot delegate his responsibility or relieve himself of his accountability to A. Thus, every delegation act involves two sets of correlative and equal responsibilities: (1) the obligations which the delegate owes to the delegator, and (2) the obligations for which the delegator is accountable to his or her superior.
We can distinguish between real and symbolic responsibility.
Real Responsibility: "Real" responsibility is the moral and practical responsibility for decisions and events. This was the essential guideline that the United States applied in the war crimes trials after World War II. Prosecutors maintained that higher leaders were responsible for the atrocities committed by subordinates even if it could not be proved that they had ordered them. In the celebrated case of the Japanese General Yamashita, it was ruled that he should be executed because of his troops' ill treatment of American prisoners of war in the Philippines. He was held responsible for prisoner welfare and could not relieve himself of the responsibility even though his defense established that he had issued orders for correct treatment. His lawyers argued that it was impossible for Yamashita to know what was going on in the camps. The military court didn't buy the argument.
A literal application of the rule of nondelegatable responsibility is attractive, but it creates problems. A manager who really believes he or she will be punished for every subordinate mistake will delegate little and will limit subordinate autonomy for fear they will fail. A group of state prison wardens were once informed by the governor that they would be held responsible for all transgressions by prison guards (ranging from smuggling in forbidden copies of Playboy magazine to assisting inmates to escape). The wardens felt that this was totally unfair because their hierarchies were too long and they didn't control the hiring and firing of guards (which was subject to civil service regulations). One warden lamented that he couldn't even tell the difference between the guards and the prisoners! To be held to a rigorous responsibility principle in their view would require them to hire a secret set of guards to be scattered among the civil service appointees with a personal obligation to report directly to the warden. Such centralization would be costly.
Some years ago several managers in large electrical equipment companies were convicted of violating federal law by meeting with competitors to fix prices and territories. In one company the department marketing manager was convicted because he personally participated in the meetings. His boss the department manager and a division vice president were convicted because they knew of the meetings. The product group executive vice president was also convicted because circumstantial evidence suggested that his behavior reflected knowledge of the illegalities. The government prosecutor then went after the president with the argument that he was ultimately responsible, but the judge ruled against this because the prosecutor had no evidence that the president had known of the actions and it was considered unreasonable to expect the chief executive to know about everything in such a large corporation. In short, if an organization becomes large enough, top executives may be able to delegate responsibility and blame failure on subordinates. Counter to the Yamashita example, the United States tended to follow this more relaxed responsibility guideline in our investigations of alleged atrocities inflicted by American troops in the Vietnam War. Only the troops immediately present, as at Mai Lai, were blamed.
Symbolic Responsibility: Symbolic responsibility usually involves a senior executive assuming responsibility for failure even when most reasonable observers would conclude that he or she shouldn't personally be held guilty. So in Japan a bank president might resign when low-level teller fraud was uncovered, or the president of Fujitsu resigned when it was disclosed that his firm had violated laws by supplying sensitive computer equipment to the Soviet Onion. In the United States, such symbolic acceptance of guilt seldom includes resignation, but it might involve a public mea culpa as in Lee laccoca's extraordinary apology to the American public for Chrysler's disconnecting odometers while its cars were being used as executive vehicles prior to public sale.
Restoring morale is the primary purpose of such symbolic responsibility. When something goes wrong, the senior executive presiding over the mistake will "take responsibility" to lift the blame from his or her subordinates. This encourages a conscious mutual dependence between seniors and juniors. Those below know that those above will protect them, but they have a corresponding obligation not to embarrass their superiors. This was a tactic practiced brilliantly by President John Kennedy in accepting final responsibility for the Bay of Pigs fiasco in the Cuban invasion of 1961.
What Jane Wilson Might Have Done
At the height of the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln wrote to General (J. S. Grant expressing:
. .. entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant, and pleased with this I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you.... If there is anything wanting which is in my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army, and a just cause, may God sustain you.
Unfortunately, President Edgar Jefferson at Cutting Edge was no Lincoln so the easiest stone to cast in the case of Jane Wilson is of course at Jefferson. He simply didn't clarify what form of delegation he was using. If he intended form 1, "Gather the facts and I will decide," Wilson probably did an adequate job. But apparently Jefferson expected more, unclear as it is. Why Jefferson was so uninvolved in these events is unknown. Perhaps he was basically pleased with division performance in pursuing new business and didn't deem expense control as important as encouraging entrepreneurial zest. Or perhaps the changes would have been nice but not worth his personal investment of time or expenditure of his political capital. Or most cynically, perhaps the committee was just a bone thrown to the board of directors to placate their concerns.
Our primary interest here, however, is not with Jefferson, but with Jane Wilson's dilemma. Most ambitious young subordinates think that they would want very broad delegation like Lincoln's to Grant. But the risk is that your boss will not be available and supportive when needed. And when Jane needed support, she just couldn't or didn't try to get the president involved. What could she have done to provoke action?
Let's recast the delegation continuum in terms of questions the subordinate might ask a superior.
Subordinate's Possible Questions
- After I look into the problem, should I give you all the facts so that you can decide?
- Should I let you know the alternatives available with the advantages and disadvantages of each so you can decide which to select?
- Should I recommend a course of action for you to implement over your name?
- Should I propose for your approval a course of action to be implemented in my name?
- Should 1 take action in my name, informing you in advance and of results?
- Should I take action in my name, informing you after I've acted?
- Should I take action in my name informing you only if I am unsuccessful?
- Should I take action in my name without any communication of intentions or results?
In dealing with her dilemma, Jane Wilson might well have put some of these questions to the president, preferably different questions for different recommendations. Good political advice on her part might have divided the seventeen proposals into implementation modes. For example:
- "Proposals 13 to 18 I will simply implement over my own name. They only deal with minor issues like office supplies. But, if you get complaints from the divisions, I'd appreciate your support."
- "Proposals 8 to 12 are a little tougher and it would help me if you put your approval initials on my notices."
- "The first seven proposals are more fundamental and I think they must go out over your signature. In fact, the first three raise basic strategy issues so there will be strong field resistance. I would suggest that you call all the division managers together and mount a major meeting to dramatize their importance."
Such recommendations would require a wise and politically astute Jane Wilson, but that is precisely what you should strive to be. To speak so candidly to the boss also requires courage. In effect, you would be saying, "Boss, you're wrong; your theory of how the decisions would be made and changes implemented just won't work. It won't happen automatically, you must get involved. I can't do it alone." Admitting your own weakness is tough, but Wilson exhibited even greater weakness in abdicating to the committee and in not pushing Jefferson (however politely) to action.
Initiation upward can be difficult when the boss seems uninterested or unreceptive. The athletic metaphor of "you score the touchdown" that your superior may profess is often misleading, however. In an effort to appear to be a "modern" manager able to pick good people and then not interfere, your superior may seem to not need to be kept informed. Often, it is just an act, however. While the boss doesn't want you repeatedly to seek permission, he or she does want to know what is going on. The head of a network-owned local television station was recently fired after only a year on the job even though market share, advertising revenue, and profits had all increased. Upon being queried by a reporter, the network chief complained that, "He just didn't tell me what he was doing; 1 kept waiting for shoes to drop without warning."
Remember that your superior has his or her own anxieties. His or her boss may expect him or her to be always current, but your boss doesn't want to be continually interrogating you. A sensitive subordinate finds subtle ways to keep the superior aware, perhaps by soliciting advice: "J.R., I feel I have a viable solution. Here's what I am going to do. Based on your experience, have I missed something?" Such an approach can be flattering to the superior as well as relieving his or her anxiety by giving an opportunity to head off an expensive error.
Under communicating upward is particularly common among ambitious, self-confident young people. Some years ago I told my wife that my superiors never seemed quite as pleased with my performance as objective results indicated they should be. My wife replied that I suffered from "a closed hand syndrome." She described canasta which is a rummy-type game in which you can meld or lay down your sets as you go or hold them until the end when you can declare "canasta!" and catch your opponents with penalty points. In her opinion I tended to do excellent work, but never told anyone about it until I could dazzle my audience with a brilliant surprise. Unfortunately, some of my superiors haven't appreciated the surprises.
Ambitious young women like Jane Wilson can experience a particular double bind. They want to demonstrate that they are self-reliant, that counter to chauvinist expectations, they don't need their "hand held" when engaging tough tasks. Therefore, they are reluctant to solicit advice from superiors for fear it will be perceived as a sign of weakness. Unfortunately, they thereby miss out on some informal guidance while contributing to their superiors' anxieties.
Advice for Handling Unclear Delegation
- Temper your excitement about a challenging high-visibility assignment with awareness of the need to clarify what degree of delegation is intended.
- Be willing to provoke delegation clarification through manufacturing incidents that require the superior to monitor, approve, or initiate directives.
- Remember that most senior managers have their own anxieties. They don't like surprises. So keep your superior informed of what you are doing, even if he or she professes not to require such communication.
- It is safer to err on the side of excessive upward communication. Above all, don't flee from potentially difficult conversations with the boss by avoiding him or her.
- Be courageous in confronting your superior with political information that suggests his or her strategy will not work. Offer an objective political analysis of what people and forces are with this strategy or against it. But focus political intelligence on the effect on performance, not its affect on your own standing with the boss.
- Accept the inevitable limitations of the principle that authority can be created, but responsibility cannot be delegated. Adherence to the rule is desirable in theory and worth striving for in most actual situations, but rigid application can be unfair to many individuals and lead to excessive centralization.
- Recognize that stomach butterflies usually will accompany your delegation to subordinates. Of course you could do the job better if you had time, but your job is to train your subordinates to surpass you.
- Don't allow your subordinates to escape responsibility for actions by pushing the next step back on your shoulders. End most conversations with a statement of the next action expected of them.
